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I refer to the orders of denial of the right to inspect in
part and quashing of the subpoena in part as affecting the
substantial rights of a party. Clearly they do, because one
of the very questions at issue is whether the council acted
arbitrarily, and necessarily involved therein were the surveys
made and the method of making them. Hence, insofar as
plaintiff was deprived of his right to take the deposition and
inspect the surveys, accepting the names and identity of the
employers furnishing data and the rate of compensation of
particular employees, the trial court was in error. It is not
necessary to decide whether it was necessary for plaintiff
to take exception to the orders because the judgment should
be reversed on the grounds heretofore mentioned.

[L. A. No. 21347.

In Bank.

Mar. 10, 1953.]

SEVEN UP BOTTLING COMPANY OF LOS ANGELES
INCORPORATED, Appellant, v. GROCERY DRIVERS
UNION LOCAL 848 (an Unincorporated Association)
et al., Respondents.
[1] Appeal-Scope and Extent of Review-Pleadings.-Where proceedings on a preliminary injunction are separate from those
leading to a judgment of dismissal on ground that complaint
does not state a cause of action, and an appeal is taken only
from such judgment, the court on appeal will not consider
affidavits presented in connection with such injunction but
will consider only the complaint.
[2] Labor-Jurisdictional Strike Law-Activities Prohibited.-Alleged activities of defendant labor organizations consisting
of concerted interference with plaintiff-employer's business
arising out of a controversy between defendants and another
labor organization, which had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with plaintiff, as to which of these organizations should have exclusive right to bargain collectively
with plaintiff, fall within terms of Jurisdictional Strike Act.
(Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120.)
[3] Id.-Pleading.-In employer's complaint against labor organizations for violation of Jurisdictional Strike Act, an inference that the cause of defendants' concerted activities or
picketing was a dispute between them and another labor orMcK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 966; [2, 7, 9]
Labor, §21; [3] Labor, §27; [4,6] Labor, §23; [5] Labor, §25;
[8] Labor, § 20a.
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[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

ganization, which had entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with plaintiff, may reasonably be drawn from an
allegation that "Thereby, a controversy has arisen between the
defendants" and such other labor organization "as to which
of them has or should have the exclusive right to have its
members perform work for the plaintiff," since use of the
word "thereby" in such quotation does not mean that there
was no dispute between defendants and the other labor organization before such activities were launched.
Id.-Picketing.-Peaceful picketing is identified with freedom
of speech or a means by which the pickets communicate to
others the existence of a labor controversy, though such identification does not free picketing from all restraint.
!d.-Injunctive Relief.-Injunctive relief against picketing is
available where the object sought to be achieved or the means
used to achieve it are unlawful.
Id.-Picketing.-The clear and present danger test as applied
in the ordinary free speech cases is not necessarily controlling
in determining whether picketing should be restrained.
!d.-Jurisdictional Strike Act.-The clear and present danger
test is satisfied where the concerted activities of defendant
labor organizations will have the immediate result of thwarting the main purpose of the Jurisdictional Strike Act to protect an employer against interferencP with his business and
the public from disturbances resulting from a dispute between
unions as to which should have the right to bargain collectively
with the employer.
!d.-Economic Pressure Activities.-The rights of employers
and employees to conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others for a share in the products of industry are
subject to modification or qualification in the interests of the
society in which they exist.
Id.- Jurisdictional Strike Act- Validity.- Jurisdictional
Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120) is valid, it being within
the function of the Legislature to declare, as the policy of this
state, that an employer's business shall not be interfered with
or the public welfare disrupted by reason of an argument
between two or more unions as to which shall be chosen to
represent his employees.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Archie D. Mitchell, .Judge.'~ Reversed.
[4] Lawful or proper labor purpose as condition of right of
rwaceful picketing, note, 174 A.L.R. 593. See, also, Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.
Supp, (1945 Rev.), Labor, § 223 et seq.
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Couneil.
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Thomas P. Menzies, Harold L. Watt, Carl M. Gould and
Hill, Farrer & Burrill for Appellant.
Roth & Bahrs and George 0. Bahrs as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Appellant.
Stevenson & Richman, '!'odd & 'rodd, Clarence E. Todd, John
C. Stevenson and Arthur Garrett for Respondents.
Charles P. Scully and 'I'obriner & Lazarus as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Respondents.
CARTER, J.-By its complaint in this action plaintiff
sought injunctive relief and damages. Following the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the case was called for
trial, at which time defendants' objection to the introduction of any evidence on the ground that the complaint did
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action was
sustained, and the court gave judgment that plaintiff recover
nothing, but continued the preliminary injunction in force
pending appeal. This appeal is by plaintiff from that judgment. There is no appeal from the order granting the injunction. There was a dispute as to whether the appeal was
from the order sustaining the objection to the evidence, or
from the judgment, but that was resolved in favor of the
latter appeal. (Seven Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Drivers
Union, 97 Cal.App.2d 623 [218 P.2d 41] .)
[1] Preliminarily it should be observed that defendants
assert that some affidavits presented in connection with the
preliminary injunction proceedings should be considered on
this appeal as supplementing and explaining the complaint,
because they were brought here by plaintiff as a part of the
"clerk's transcript." The judgment from which the appeal
is taken, however, is the same as one of dismissal after demurrer sustained. No appeal was taken by defendants from
the order granting the preliminary injunction, or from the
judgment and, of course, plaintiff is not objecting to the
order. The primary issue presented for decision in the court
below and here is the validity of California's Jurisdictional
Strike Law, infra. The court, in rendering its judgment,
did not purport to pass upon anything but the sufficiency
of the complaint. The proceedings on the preliminary injunction were separate from those leading to the judgment.
Hence we deem it proper to consider only the complaint,
and such cases as Brock v. Fouchy, 76 Cal.App.2d 363 [172
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P.2d 945], Mason v. Drug, Inc., 31 Cal.App.2d 697 [88 P.2d
929], and Fox Chicago R. Corp. v. Zukor's Dresses, Inc., 50
Cal.App.2d 129 [122 P.2d 705], relied upon by defendants,
are not controlling.
The complaint is in four counts. Plaintiff is a corporation
engaged in the business of bottling and distributing beverages. Most of defendants are labor unions, referred to as
teamsters' unions, and are labor organizations existing for
the purpose of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, hours and working conditions. Other
defendants are officers or agents of the unions. All defendants have acted in "concert" in the activities stated in the
complaint. Plaintiff employs persons in its business who
were, in March, 1949, members of Seven Up Employees Association, hereafter referred to as the association, an unincorporated labor organization of employees existing for the
usual purposes of such groups. The association is not financed,
dominated or controlled in any respect by plaintiff. In March,
1949, plaintiff .and the association entered into a collective
bargaining agreement prescribing the wage rate, working conditions, etc., of plaintiff's employees, which is still in effect.
Since June, 1949, defendants have been carrying on concerted
''economic activities'' to compel plaintiff to recognize defendant unions as the collective bargaining agents of its employees, and a controversy has arisen between defendants and
the association as to which should represent plaintiff's employees. The activities consist of picketing by defendants of retail food markets where plaintiff's products are sold, resulting
in the refusal of those markets to buy or sell plaintiff's products. Plaintiff has no dispute or controversy with any of its
employees with regard to wages, hours or working conditions.
All of the foregoing appears from the first count in the
complaint. In addition it is charged that plaintiff has suffered
damages of over $2,000 because of defendants' acts and that
the damage remedy is inadequate. The second, third and
fourth counts reallege the first count. Count two asserts that
defendants' actions violated the Jurisdictional Strike Law,
infra; count three, that defendants, by their activities, are
endeavoring to induce plaintiff and~ its employees to break
the 1949 collective bargaining agreement between plaintiff
and the association. Count four alleges that the activities of
defendants are aimed at compelling plaintiff to recognize defendants as bargaining agents when it would be unlawful
for plaintiff to do so, for to compel their employees to be-
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long to a certain union would he in violation of sections 921fJ23 of the Labor Code and the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 (29 U.S.C.A., § 141 et seq.); and that as a result it has been damaged in the sum of $100,000.
On this appeal plaintiff rests its case on the Jurisdictional
Strike Act, infra, public policy, Labor Code, sections 921-923
and interference with contract relations.
The JurisdictioMl Strike Act was adopted in 1947 (Stats.
1947, ch. 1388) by adding sections 1115-1120 to the Labor
Code. A jurisdictional strike is defined as ''a concerted
refusal to perform work for an employer or any other concerted interference with an employer's operation or business, arising out of a controversy between two or more labor
organizations as to which of them has or should have the
exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employer on
behalf of his employees or any of them, or arising out of a
controversy between two or more labor organizations as to
which of them has or should have the exclusive right to have
its members perform work for an employer." (Lab. Code,
§ 1118.) A labor organization is "any organization or any
agency or employee representation committee or any local
unit thereof in which employees participate, and exists for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours of employment or conditions of work, which labor organization is
not found to be financed in whole or in part, interfered with,
dominated or controlled by the employer." (Id. § 1117.)
Nothing in the act shall ''interfere with collective bargaining subject to the prohibitions herein set forth, nor to prohibit any individual voluntarily becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, or from personally requesting any
other individual to join a labor organization." (I d. § 1119.)
The jurisdictional strike is "against the public policy" of the
state and is "unlawful," (I d. § 1115) and any person suffering injury from a violation of the act is entitled to injunctive relief and damages. (Id., § 1116.)
In view of the result reached herein it will be necessary
to consider only the Jurisdictional Strike Law. There is
no allegation showing that plaintiff was engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce and hence the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, supra, has no application.
[2] It should be clear that the activities of defendants,
as alleged, fall within the terms of the act (Jurisdictional
Strike Act). Defendants and the association are labor organizations and the latter is not financed, interfered with,
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dominated or controlled by plaintiff. There has been a concerted interference by defendants with plaintiff's-employer's
business. That interference arises out of a controversy between two or more labor organizations-defendants and the
association-as to which of them should have the right to
collectively bargain with plaintiff-employer. The latter follows from the allegation in the complaint that there was a
collective bargaining agreement between the association and
plaintiff, to the former of which plaintiff's employees belong,
and that agreement controls the labor relations between them.
Since then defendants have been carrying on concerted economic activities (picketing) to compel plaintiff to choose
defendants as the exclusive bargaining representatives of
its employees, who are working under the agreement. [3] It
may reasonably be inferred that the cause of such activity
was a dispute between defendants and the association, for
their demands to be exclusive agents would necessarily be
to replace the association, and it was expressly alleged that:
'' 'rhereby, a controversy has arisen between the defendants
and the Seven Up Employees' Association as to which of
them has or should have the exclusive right to have its members perform work for the plaintiff in the job classifications
above set forth." We do not take the use of "thereby" in
the above quotation to mean that there was no dispute between defendants and the association before the activities
were launched. Implicit in the pleading is the assertion of
a dispute between defendants and the association which the
former seek to win by their activities. In addition to the
above it is alleged that defendants, Grocery Drivers Union
Local 848, and the association claim bargaining rights on behalf of plaintiff's employees; that the bargaining agreement
with the association was in full force and satisfactory to
the association, and that defendants "knew of the existencE'
of said contract and of the arrangements between plaintiff
<md its employees thereunder."
Defendants' contention of unconstitutionality of the act
rests on the argument that under the guaranties of freedom
of speech and of the press the picketing was lawful, and the
act, therefore, in condemning concerted interference with
the employer's business, is invalid, because it deprives them
of the right to engage in lawful coneerted action, that is,
peaceful picketing; that such activity does not create a "clear
and present danger'' justifying a restraint on the freedoms
mentioned,
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[4] Peaceful picketing has been identified with freedom
of speech-a means by which the pickets communicate to
others the existence of a labor controversy. (Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 [60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093]; Carlson
v. California, 310 U.S. 106 [60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104];
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 [61
S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. 855] ; Carpenters & J. Union v. Ritter's
Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 [62 S.Ct. 807, 86 L.Ed. 1143] ; Bakery &
P. Driver's & Helpers, I.B.T. v. Wahl, 315 U.S. 769 [62 S.Ct.
816, 86 I ... Ed. 1178] ; Hotel&; R. E. Intl. Alliance v. Wisconsin
Emp. Relations Board, 315 U.S. 437 [62 S.Ct. 706, 86 L.Ed.
946]; Cafeteria Emp. Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 [64
S.Ct. 126, 88 L.Ed. 58] ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 [65
S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430] ; J.11cllay v. Retail A1do. S.L. Union
No. 1067, 16 Cal.2d 311 [106 P.2d 373]; Ste1:ner v. Long Beach
Local No. 128, 19 Cal.2d 676 [123 P.2d 20]; In re Bell, 19
Cal.2d488 [122 P.2d22] ; MagiU Bros., Inc. v. Building Service
Intl. Union, 20 Cal.2d 506 [127 P.2d 542]; People v. Dail,
22 Cal.2d 642 [140 P.2d 828]; Emde v. San Joaquin County
Central Labor Council, 23 Cal.2d146 [143 P.2d 20, 150 A.L.R.
916]; James v. illarinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721 [155 P.2d 329,
160 A.L.R. 900] ; Park & T.I. Corp. v. International etc. of
Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 1426];
In re Porterfield, 28 Cal.2d 91 [168 P.2d 706, 167 A.L.R. 675] ;
In re Blaney, 30 Cal.2d 643 [184 P.2d 892] ; Northwestern
Pac. R. Co. v. Lumber & S.W. Union, 31 Cal.2d 441 [189 P.2d
277].) It has been pointed out that such identification does
not free the concerted activity of picketing from all restraint.
[5] ''And it appears to be settled that injunctive relief
against picketing is available where the object sought to be
achieved or the means used to achieve it are unlawful. (See,
Park & T.I. Corp. v. International etc. Teamsters, supra;
James v. Marinship Corp., supra; Magill Bros., Inc. v. Building SeTvice Emp. Intl. Union, supra; Dorchy v. State of
Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 [47 S.Ct. 86,71 LEd. 248]; Mille Wagon
Driver·s Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, supra [312 U.S. 287
(85 L.Ed. 836, 61 S.Ct. 552, 132 A.L.R. 1200)]; Carpenters
Union v. Ritter's Cafe, sup1·a; Allen-Bradley Local v. Board,
315 U.S. 740 [62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154] . . . .
''The solution of labor problems requires, however, an
approach with a broader perspective. Although literally,
and in a strict sense, the objective or means employed in the
union activity may be unlawful, there still remains the necessity for preserving the general public welfare and the con-
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stitutional guaranties of freedom of speech, press and assembly. The asserted illegality may be merely incidental or of
only minor importance when weighed against the requirement
of competition and some measure of equality in the economic
struggle between the seller and purchaser of services. The
public interest may tip the scales one way or the other.
If preventive relief were available in every instance of labor
activity interfering with the performance by a common carrier or other public utility of its duties, or involving some
unlawful act, no matter how insignificant on the part of the
person upon whom the economic pressure is exerted, conceivably there would be little left in the way of protection
for the exercise of the fundamental rig·hts of freedom of
speech, press and assembly, and organized labor would be at
a serious if not hopeless disadvantage in our competitive
economy." (Northwestern Pac. R. Co. v. Lumber & S.W.
Union, supra, 31 Cal.2d 441, 445.)
[6] Furthermore, it should be noted that the clear and
present danger test as applied in the ordinary free speech
cases is not "necessarily" controlling. (In re Blaney, supra,
30 Cal.2d 643, 646.) Since the foregoing cases were decided
the United States Supreme Court has upheld restraints on
picketing without mentioning clear and present danger.
(Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 [70 S.Ct. 718, 94
L.Ed. 985] ; International Bro. of Teamsters Union v. Hanke,
339 U.S. 470 [70 S.Ct. 773, 94 L.Ed. 995, 13 A.L.R.2d 631] .)
In a case in the group of recent cases hereinafter discussed, in
which the test was mentioned, it was set forth as follows: ''The
Missouri policy against restraints of trade is of long standing
and is in most respects the same as that which the Federal
Government has followed for more than half a century. It is
clearly drawn in an attempt to afford all persons an equal
opportunity to buy goods. There was clear danger, imminent
and immediate, that unless restrained, appellants would succeed in making that policy a dead letter insofar as purchases
by nonunion men were concerned. Appellants' power with
that of their allies was irresistible. And it is clear that appellants were doing more than exercising a right of free
speech or press. . . . They were exercising their economic
power together with that of their allies to compel Empire
to abide by union rather than by state regulation of trade.''
(Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502
[69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834] .) [7] Under that view, and
application of the test, it is clear that defendants' activities
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he1·e will havP the immediate result of thwarting the main

purpose of the act to proteet an employer against interference
with l1iR businm:s and the public from disturbaner,s resulting
from a dispute bPtwer,n unions as to which should have the
right to bargain eolleetivr,ly (and all that r,ntails) with the
employer. 'l'hus it would appear that the test as stated in the
Uiboney case, s·upm, is here satisfied.
'l'his brings us then to the question of the extent to which
the I-'egislature may regulate activities, which have some
aspects of free speech, in labor controversies, and particularly
those activities relating to disputes between rival unions, both
seeking to attain the status of the exclusive bargaining agent
for an employer's employees. The solution hinges upon the
recent cases decided by the Unitr,d States Supreme Court.
[8] First, it should be observed that the basic case applying
the free speech guaranty to picketing had this to say while
invoking that guaranty: "It is true that the rights of employers and employees to conduct their economic affairs and
to compete with othr,rs for a share in thr, products of industry
are subject to modification or qualification in the interests
of thr, society in which they exist. This is but an instance of
the power of the State to set the limits of permissible contest
open to industrial combatants." (Thornhill v. Alabama, supra,
310 U.S. 88, 103.) Similar remarks were made in subsequent
cases. (Carpenters &: J. Union v. Ritter's Cafe, supra, 315
U.S. 722; Bakery &: P. Drivers &: Helpers, I.B.T. v. W ohl,
sttpra, 315 U.S. 769; Hotel&: R.E. Intl. Alliance v. Wisconsin
Emp. Relations Board, sup1·a, 315 U.S. 437; Thomas v. Collins,
sup-ra, 323 U.S. 516.)
Pollowing those expressions the subsequent decisions have
dealt with various situations. Giboney v. Empire Storage &:
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 [69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834], dealt with
peaceful picketing by a union in an effort to organize nonunion ice peddlr,rs, in which one ice dealer refused to agree
not to sell to such peddlers. .A judgment enjoining peaceful
picketing to compr,l that dealer to make such an agreement
was upheld by the Supreme Court of Missouri on the ground
that to compel the dealer to agree would be in violation of
Missouri's anti trade restraint act. The Supreme Court of
the United States upheld the injunction, stating: "Neither
Thornh1:U v. Alabama, supra, nor Carlson v. California, 310
U.S. 106 [60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104], both decided on the
same clay, supports the contention that conduct otherwise unlawful is always immune from state regulation because an
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integral part of that conduct is carried on by display of
placards by peaceful picketers. In both these cases this Court
struck down statutes which banned all dissemination of information by people adjacent to certain premises, pointing out
that the statutes were so broad that they could not only be
utilized to punish conduct plainly illegal but could also he
applied to ban all truthful publications of the faets of a
labor controversy. But in the Thornhill opinion, at pp. 108104, the Court was careful to point out that it was within the
province of states 'to set the limits of permissible contest open
to industrial combatants.' See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536, 542, 557
[69 S.Ct. 251, 260, 267, 93 L.Ed. 212, 6 A.L.R.2d 473] ;
Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Emp. Relation Board, 315
U.S. 740, 748-751 [62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154]. Further
emphasizing the power of a state 'to set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants' the Court
cited with approval the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, at 488
[ 41 S.Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349]. On that page the opinion stated:
'The conditions developed in industry may be such that those
engaged in it cannot continue their struggle without danger
to the community. But it is not for judges to determine
whether such conditions exist, nor is it their function to set
the limits of permissible contest and to declare the duties
which the new situation demands. This is the function of
the legislature which, while limiting individual and group
rights of aggression and defense, may substitute processes of
justice for the more primitive method of trial by combat.'
''After emphasizing state power over industrial conflicts,
the Court in the Thornhill opinion went on to say, at p. 104,
that ~tates may not 'in dealing with the evils arising from
industrial disputes . . . impair the effective exercise of the
right to discuss freely industrial relations . . . . ' 'l'his statement must be considered in its context. It was directed towan1
a sweeping state prohibition which this Court found to embrace 'nearly every practicable, effective means whereby those
interested-including the employees directly affected-ma)·
enlighten the public Oil the uature and causes of a labor dispute.' . . .
''A ppellaHt::; al,;o rely on Carpenters & J. Union v. Rittm·'s
Cafe, :nil U.S. 722 [62 S.Ct. 807, 86 l.J.Ed. 1143], and Bakery
& P. Dn'vers & Helpers, I.B.T. v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 [62
S. Ct. 8] 6, 86 L.Ed. 1178], decided the same day. Neither
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lends support to the contention that peaceful picketing is beyond legislative control. The Court's opinion in the Ritter
case approvingly quoted a part of the Thornhill opinion which
recognized broad state powers over industrial conflicts. In
the Wohl case, the Court's opinion at p. 775 found no 'violence,
force or coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive' and said that 'A state is not required to tolerate in all
places . . . even peaceful picketing by an individual.' A
concurring opinion in the W ohl case, at pp. 776-777, pointed
out that picketing may include conduct other than speech,
conduct which can be made the subject of restrictive legislation. No opinions relied on by petitioners assert a constitutional right in picketers to take advantage of speech or press
to violate valid laws designed to protect important interests
of society." (Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 498 [69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834] .)
The Giboney case was followed by Hughes v. Sttperior Con?"f,
339 U.S. 460 [70 S.Ct. 718, 94 L.Ed. 985], where the California court was upheld in enjoining Negroes from pieketing
a store to enforce a demand that it hire a proportionate number of Negroes on the ground that it was picketing to compel
raeial discrimination, which was against the court declared
public policy of the state. Four justices agreed with the
opinion written by Justice Frankfurter and Justices Black,
Minton and Reed concurred on the ground the case was controlled by the Giboney case. .Justice Douglas did not participate. It was again pointed out that picketing is not free
from any restraint even though having aspects of communication, stressing its coercive features.
Next came Building Service Emp. Intl. Union v. Ga.zzam,
339 U.S. 532 [70 S.Ct. 784, 94 hEd. 1045]. There in a suit
for damages by a hotel owner employer, the employer had
refused to sign a closed shop contract with a union because
his employees at an election had declined to join the union,
and for him to sign would violate a Washington statutory
policy forbidding him to coerce his employees' choice of representative. Peaceful picketing followed and the Washington
court gave damages and injunctive relief. The Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed, holding that there was
no violation of the free speech guaranty. After pointing ont
that picketing may be restricted, the court said: "The pnblie
policy of any state is to be found in its constitution, aets of
the legislature, and decisions of its courts. 'Primarily it is for
the lawmakers to determine the public policy of the State.' . . .
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''The State of Washington has by legislative enactment
rleclared its public policy on the subject of organization of
workers for bargaining purposes. . . . Under the so-enunciated public policy of Washington, it is clear that workers
shall be free to join or not to join a union, and that they
shall be free from the coercion, interference, or restraint of
mnployers of labor in the designation of their representatives
for collective bargaining. Picketing of an employer to compel him to coerce his employees' choice of a bargaining representative is an attempt to induce a transgression of this policy, and the State here restrained the advocates of such
transgression from further action with like aim. To judge
the wisdom of such policy is not for us; ours is but to determine whether a restraint of picketing in reliance on the policy
is an unwarranted encroachment upon rights protected from
state abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment.
''. . . An adequate basis for the instant decree is the
unlawful objective of the picketing, namely, coercion by the
employer of the employees' selection of a bargaining representative." (Building Service Emp. Intl. Union v. Gazzam,
supra, 339 U.S. 532, 537.)
In International B1·o. of Teamsters Union v. Hanke, supra,
339 U.S. 4 70, the peaceful picketing by one picket was aimed
at a person in the automobile repair business without employees because he kept open at times that were proscribed
by agreement between the union and an association of employers engaged in the same business. The banner of the
picket merely said "Union People Look for the Union Shop
Card." The injunction was upheld in an opinion written
by Justice Frankfurter, concurred in by three justices. Justice Clark concurred in the result. 'l'hree justices dissented.
,Justice Frankfurter said: ''Our decisions reflect recognition
that picketing is 'indeed a hybrid.' . . . The effort in the
cases has been to strike a balance between the constitutional
protection of the element of communication in picketing and
'the power of the State to set the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants.' . . . A State's judgment
on striking such a balance is of course subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Embracing as such a
judgment does, however, a State's social and economic policieH, which in turn depend on knowledge and appraisal of
local social and economic factors, such judgment on these
matters comes to this Court bearing a weighty title of respect.

i380

SEVEN UP E'l'C. Co. v. GROCERY E'l'C.

UNION

[ 40

C.2d

'r. 'fhesl~ two cases emphasize the nature of a problem that
is presented by our duty of sitting in judgment on a State's
judgment in striking the balance that has to be struek when
a State decides not to keep hands off these industrial contests. Here we have a glaring instance of the interplay of
competing social-economic interests and viewpoints. Unions
obviously are concerned not to have union standards undermined by non-union shops. 'l'his interest penetrates into selfemployer shops. On the other hand, some of our profoundest
thinkers from Jefferson to Brandeis have stressed the importance to a democratic society of encouraging self-employer
economic units as a counter-movement to what are deemed
to be the dangers inherent in excessive concentration of economic power." (International Bro. of Teamsters Union v.
Hanke, supra, 339 U.S. 470, 474.)
International Brotherhood v. National Labor Rel. Board,
341 U.S. 694 [71 S.Ct. 954, 95 L.Ed. 1299], held that picketing in aid of a secondary boycott which was proscribed by
statute could be prevented.
[9] Those cases and the discussion therein leave no doubt
as to the validity of the instant act. It is not vague or uncertain as was the act in In re Blaney, supra. It is no more
subject to attack than the broad language used in the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 dealing with secondary
boycott. In upholding this act the Supreme Court said: ''The
prohibition of inducement or encouragement of secondary
pressure by§ 8(b) (4) (A) carries no unconstitutional abridgment of free speech. The inducement or encouragement in
the instant case took the form of picketing followed by a telephone call emphasizing its purpose. The constitutionality of
§ 8(b) (4) (A) is here questioned only as to its possible relation to the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. This provision has been sustained by several Courts
of Appeals. The substantive evil condemned by Congress
in § 8 (b) ( 4) is the secondary boycott and we recently have
recognized the constitutional right of states to proscribe picketing in furtherance of comparably unlawful objectives. There
is no reason why Congress may not do likewise.
"Petitioners object to the breadth of the Board's order
as stated in 82 N.L.R.B. at 1030, supra, 341 U.S. 698-699, 71
S.Ct. 957. They contend that its language prohibits inducement not only of employees of Deltorto but also the inducement of employees of any other employer to strike, where
an object thereof is to force Giorgi or any other employer
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or person to cease doing business with Langer. To confine
the order solely to secondary pressure through Giorgi or
Deltorto would leave Langer and other employers who do
business with him exposed to the same type of pressure
through other comparable channels. The order properly enjoins petitioners from exerting this pressure upon Langer,
through other employers, as well as through Giorgi and Deltorto. We may well apply here the principle stated in Inter-national Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400 [68
S.Ct. 12, 17, 92 L.Ed. 20]: 'When the purpose to restrain
trade appears from a clear violation of law, it is not necessary
that all of the untraveled roads to that end be left open and
that only the worn one be closed.' " (International Brotherhood v. National Labor Rel. Board, supra, 341 U.S. 694,
705.) The ,Jurisdictional Strike Law here involved specifically provides that a concerted refusal to work or concerted
interference with an employer's business is against public
policy when it arises out of a dispute between two labor organizations as to which should have the exclusive right to
bargain collectively. Hence an activity such as picketing
to achieve unlawful ends, refusal to work or interference
with the employer's business when the dispute is between two
organizations seeking exclusive rights, is banned. Wisely or
unwisely the Legislature has declared the policy of this state
that an employer's business shall not be interfered with or
the public welfare disrupted by reason of an argument between two or more unions as to which shall be chosen to
represent his employees, a matter which may hinge largely on
the respective claims of the quality of representation. The
act eliminates the situation where the labor organization is
employer controlled, hence an independent union is not prevented from endeavoring to organize an employer's employeps
when they belong to an employer controllerl union or no union.
'Whatever may have been the rnle before the recent rlecisions
of the Uniterl States SuprPmP Court, supra, we have the ad
which declares the public pol iry of this state and those eases
establish its validity.
Judgment reversed.
Gibson, C. ,J., Shenk, ,J., Edmonds, .J., TraynQr, .J.,
Schauer, .T., and Spence, .T., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2,
1953.

